Pelin Akçagün and Adem Yavuz Elveren

June 2021

WORKINGPAPER SERIES
Number 545

POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Financialization and Militarization:
An Empirical Investigation

Financialization and Militarization: An Empirical Investigation1
Pelin Akçagün
Ondokuz Mayıs University, Samsun, Turkey
Adem Yavuz Elveren
Fitchburg State University, Fitchburg, MA, United States
Abstract
Based on Arrighi (1994), we empirically investigate whether financialization and militarization
are mutually reinforcing phenomena in the US during the post-WW II period. Military spending
during the 1950s and 1960s in the US, along with other external stimuli, such as a rising sales
effort and expansion in finance, insurance, and real estate, counteracted the stagnation of the
monopolistic stage of capitalism. Monopoly capital was transformed into finance monopoly capital
as the intensity of financial capital increased during the late 1970s in response to stagnation.
Considering alternative financialization variables commonly used in the literature and the profit
rate in the financial sector, and using several parametric and non-parametric methods, we found a
significant relationship between financialization and militarization in the US for 1949-2019. The
findings show that the decline in the profit rates lead to a decline in military expenditure. The
overall results suggest that the rise in financialization is parallel to the decline in the profit rates,
leading to larger military expenditure in total, but with relatively smaller share in GDP.
Key Words: Financialization, military spending, Marxist economics, Generalized Additive
Models
JEL Classifications: B51; C1
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1. Introduction
We empirically examine the argument, based Arrighi (1994), that financialization and
militarization are mutually reinforcing phenomena during the post-WW II period for the US.
Finance capital, as Hilferding labeled it, or monopoly-finance capital, as Sweezy (1994)
preferred, began to dominate the dynamics of the accumulation of capital, particularly during the
1980s. According to Keynes, financialization represented the end of capitalist rationality, and he
referred to it as “bubble on a whirlpool of speculation” (Sweezy 1994; Foster 2005). In
Monopoly Capital, Baran and Sweezy (1966) argued that stagnation is the normal state of
monopoly capitalism. That is, to absorb surplus, the government uses sales effort, the financial
sector (i.e., finance, insurance, and real estate - FIRE), capitalists’ consumption and investment,
and continuous and excessive military spending. This makes the system irrational because it can
only protect itself through wasteful sales effort and military spending instead of productive
civilian investment and welfare spending. That is, financial capitalism is not a new stage or form
of capitalism but the system’s response to the decline in profitability as a new phase of
neoliberalism (Kotz 2010).
Military spending during the 1950s and 1960s in the US, along with other external
stimuli, such as a rising sales effort and financial expansion, counteracted the stagnation of the
monopolistic stage of capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 1966). Nevertheless, the long-term problem
of underconsumption required further measures. Monopoly capital was transformed into finance
monopoly capital as the volume and intensity of financial capital increased during the late 1970s2
(Magdoff and Sweezy 1987; Foster and McChenesy 2012). While the role of military spending
as an external stimulus continued, it may be argued that these two stimuli are not independent;
rather, they mutually generated and reinforced each other to sustain the financial capitalism
2

Finance monopoly capital (or financialization/financial capitalism) refers to i) the increased weight of the financial

sector (e.g. finance, insurance, and real estate - FIRE) in GDP and financial profits in total profits, along with the
proliferation and widespread use of opaque financial instruments; ii) the recent tendency whereby large companies
self-finance by using retained earnings and capital markets (instead of relying on banks), and the emergence of
shadow banking; iii) “the widespread adoption by firms of policies of shareholder value maximization; policies that
focus on enriching shareholders rather than addressing the productive prospects of the enterprise”; iv) higher
indebtedness of households as a share of their disposable income; and finally v) expanding role of financial bubbles
(Foster and McChesney 2012; Mavroudeas and Papadatos 2018: 452).
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centered in the US. The absolute dominance of the dollar secured the US global economic
hegemony, thereby enabling its excessive military budget. This in turn maintained the US
political power, thereby securing the dollar’s hegemony. Employing detailed statistical analysis
and non-parametric estimation methods, this study contributes to the literature by providing the
first empirical evidence on this proposition for the US for 1949-2019.
The next section outlines the literature on the relationship between financialization and
militarization. The third section presents the data, statistical analysis and the method. The fourth
section presents the empirical evidence. The conclusion highlights the study’s main inferences
and contribution to the literature.
2. Literature on the Relationship between Financialization and Militarization
Financialization is a crucial concept in the periodization of the development of
capitalism. Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital is the key work in the financialization literature,
in which he develops Marx’s ‘fictitious capital’ and explain its creation, circulation, and use by
some capitalist to make a profit.
Hilferding defines finance capital as follows:
The dependence of industry on the banks is therefore a consequence of property relationships. An everincreasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to the industrialists who use it. They are able to
dispose over capital only through the banks, which represent the owners. On the other side, the banks have
to invest an ever-increasing part of their capital in industry and in this way they become to a greater and
greater extent industrial capitalists. I call bank capital, that is, capital in money form which is actually
transformed in this way into industrial capital, finance capital (Hilferding, 1910: 225).

While Hilferding saw finance capital as the domination of industry by banks, what
matters for Lenin and Bukharin was the merging of industrial capital and finance capital that led
to the emergence of the financial oligarchy3 (Guillen 2014). For Sweezy (1942), on the other
hand, the key issue was the overlap between such capital and the transition from competitive to
3

Hilferding’s finance capital (i.e. financialization) argument is the generalization of the specific case of Germany. It

is important to distinguish between financialization patterns across the world. While Continental European countries
relied on bank finance/indirect finance, Anglo Saxon countries mostly relied on self-finance/direct finance. The
latter type of financing was adopted by developing countries in the 1990s as they relied more on new issues of
shares than debt as their primary source of finance (Singh and Hamid 1992; Singh 1995; Lapavitsas 2004).
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monopoly capitalism. In other words, finance capital become the dominant form of capital in the
monopolist stage of capitalism4 (Guillen 2014).
Neither Hobson, Hilferding, Lenin, nor Polanyi used the term financialization. Polanyi
labeled it haute finance (high finance) while Hobson referred to big financiers. The term was
first used by Magdoff and Sweezy (1987), and the Monthly Review school in general provided
important insights (see Magdoff and Sweezy 1987; Sweezy 1994; 1997; Foster 2007, 2010;
Foster and McChesney 2012). This was then used enthusiastically by post-Keynesian scholars
(Stockhammer 2004, 2009; Hein 2013; cited in Mavroudeas and Papadatos 2018: 457), who
refer to this “new” phase of capitalism as “finance dominated capitalism” (Hein 2013) or the
“finance dominated regime of accumulation” (Stockhammer 2009).
Definitions of financialization emphasize different aspects of the process.5 For example,
Krippner defines it as “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner, 2005: 174;
see also Krippner 2011) whereas, for Epstein, it is “increasing role of financial motives, financial
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and
international economies” (Epstein 2005: 3). For Fine, financialization is the intensive and
extensive accumulation of fictitious capital (or interest-bearing capital) in the accumulation of
capital (Fine 2009, 2010). There may be three aspects of financialization: involvement of
households in the credit market; change in corporate behavior; and a regime of accumulation
(Van der Zwan 2014; Epstein 2015). The first refers to the increasing volume of the mortgage
market and use of credit cards, consumer credit, and student loans (Epstein, 2015; Lapavitsas,
2013; Van der Zwan, 2014). The second aspect is a rise in non-financial companies’ financial
activities and financial focus, as measured by increasing dependency on financial activities,
increased indebtedness, the use of stock options and other stock-related compensation for CEOs
and other top management, and the implementation of a shareholder-value orientation (Lazonick
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There are two main problems in Hilferding’s thesis of finance capital. The first is that his theory of monopoly

pricing is problematic while he ignored Marx’s labor theory of value (LTV). Second, there is no empirical evidence
validating the fusion of productive with banking capital (Bond 2010; Harris 1988; cited in Mavroudeas and
Papadatos 2018: 455).
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and O’Sullivan 2000; Lapavitsas, 2013; Van der Zwan, 2014; Epstein, 2015). These two aspects
of financialization refer to quantitative increase in finance both in terms of financial profit and
volume of financial assets as a share of GDP. The third aspect of financialization, however,
refers to its important role in capitalism, a new phase in capital accumulation (Epstein, 2015;
Lapavitsas, 2013; Powell, 2019; Sawyer, 2014; cited in Rabinovich 2019: 29).
There are different understandings of financialization as the stage of the rapid
deregulation and globalization of finance capital during the 1990s. Overall, for post-Keynesians,
financialization caused stagnation as wage stagnation and income inequality led to insufficient
aggregate demand. Accordingly, “increased financial investment and increased financial profit
opportunities crowd out real investment by changing the incentives of the firm managers and
directing funds away from real investment” (Orhangazi 2008: 864). From a general Marxist
perspective, however, productive sector capitalists shifted their activity to fictitious capital
operations to address the problem of lower profitability due to underconsumption /
overaccumulation. Yet, Orhangazi notes the downsides of such simplifications to emphasize the
contradictory role of financialization in the economy in that while it facilitates capital
accumulation, it also hinders it by causing financial crises (Orhangazi 2011; 2016). He argues
that explaining the rise of finance “as some external force impinging on the economy” or “as a
response to accumulation problems in the non-financial parts of the economy” fails to present the
complex and contradictory role of the financial sector (Orhangazi 2016: 249). Among Marxist
thought, while Ben Fine (2009, 2010) and the Monthly Review school used the term along with
neoliberalism and globalization within the Marxist analytical framework, Lapavitsas and Bryan
referred to financialization as a new stage of capitalism by moving toward a post-Keynesian
framework (e.g., Bryan, Martin, and Rafferty 2009; Lapavitsas 2009, cited in Mavroudeas and
Papadatos 2018: 457).
The common insight of post-Keynesian financialization hypotheses is to consider finance
as “the new and dominant exploiter, not capital as such”, thereby seeing finance capital as the
real cause of crises, not underconsumption theory or the tendency for the profit rate to fall, as in
Marxist thought (Roberts 2018). In other words, the financialization hypotheses of the postKeynesian tradition, as well as some Marxist perspectives, such as that of Lapavitsas, argue that
financialization has created profit by extracting money from workers and firms operating in the
5

productive sector in the form of financial commissions, fees, and interest charges. That is, it is a
‘secondary exploitation’ that does not come from the exploitation of labor (Roberts 2018). In
other words, according to the financialization hypothesis, finance capital has an autonomous
structure, independent from money capital (Mavroudeas and Papadatos 2018). However, in the
Marxist framework, surplus value is created through production in the productive sector before
being allocated between productive capital, money capital, and commercial capital in terms of
profit, interest, and commercial profit, respectively. That is, profit in financial sector is simply a
transfer of some part of total profit created in the productive sector; therefore, although money
capital appears to dominate productive capital, its existence ultimately depends on productive
capital6 (Hilferding 1910; Sweezy 1942; Mavroudeas and Papadatos 2018).
Financialization and militarization as response to economic downturns
There are two main Marxist crisis theories: underconsumption/stagnation and the
tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Underconsumption/stagnation theory claims that because
workers’ purchasing power is limited (i.e., the growth of wages is below the rate of expansion of
output) there is insufficient aggregate demand when capitalists’ consumption or investment
cannot absorb the surplus, leading to stagnation. The driving force of capitalism is the persistent
search for surplus value to reach higher rates of profit. For this goal, the accumulation process
reinforces mechanization, which has two outcomes: on the one hand, mechanization increases
labor productivity as it allows workers to use more advanced tools and machinery; on the other
hand, it increases organic composition. However, rising labor productivity reduces the
profitability of capital, generating the fundamental contradiction of capitalism.
Baran and Sweezy in Monopoly Capital analyzed this chronic lack of aggregate demand
in a capitalist economy to argue that capitalist development concentrates capital in fewer giant
corporations, limiting production, investment, and workers’ buying power in order to reap higher
profits. They concluded that “the normal state of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation”
(Baran and Sweezy 1966: 108). This is not, however, because the economy is not productive
enough; rather, it is too productive to absorb the created surplus. Therefore, the surplus is
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absorbed by the capitalists’ consumption and investment, sales efforts, FIRE, civilian
government expenditure, and military spending7.
A capitalist economy must grow continuously, which requires new markets, new
products, and new technologies. Foster (2008) succinctly summarizes the difficulty of finding
such outlets. First, as economies mature, they no longer need to develop industrial structure.
Second, there are long periods during which the economy does not experience any dramatic
stimulation or transformation, for example when new technologies are introduced. Third, as
inequality tends to increase, low- and middle-income households consume less, and capital shifts
from investing in the real economy to speculative investments in the financial sector. Fourth,
price competition is weakened due to monopolization or oligopolization (Foster 2008:1). The
problem with the need for constant growth, however, is that to prevent profit rates from further
decreasing in the long term, the nature of capitalist production requires these expenditures to be
unproductive spending, such as sales efforts and military spending, rather than productive
spending, such as capitalist investment and civilian government spending, which increase wages
or capital. Kalecki (1943) also noted this key difference between civilian and military spending,
emphasizing that while monopoly capital was against civilian public spending due to its
detrimental effect on the rate of profit, they supported military spending as it does not conflict
with the interest of capitalists because it boosted the profit rate8 (Foster et al. 2008). This is the
irrationality of the capitalist mode of production.
However, such surges in unproductive spending along with the dramatic increase of labor
exploitation were not enough to prevent stagnation, the decline in the profitability. Global
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Note that Smith (1977) challenged Baran and Sweezy’s underconsumptionist explanation of high military spending

in the 1950s and 1960s in the US. He showed that military expenditure reduces economic growth because it crowds
out investment, and therefore productivity. Accordingly, for Smith, high military spending can be best explained by
its strategic role in maintaining capitalism rather than its economic effect on growth. This argument from an
empirical perspective generated debates among scholars (Elveren 2019). In fact, our general hypothesis is in line
with Smith’s argument in that higher military spending in the US is not solely due to its economic purposes in the
domestic economy but rather due to strategic reasons to reinforce its economic power by maintaining the
international capitalist order, as we argue in the following sections.
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economic transformation was an additional development that impaired this trend for the US.
Despite access to raw materials across the globe, the profitability of the US manufacturing sector
fell by around 40% between 1965 and 1973 (Brenner 2006; Meyerson and Roberto 2010: 165).
Moreover, the economies of Japan and Europe, particularly Germany, substantially increased
their share in manufacturing exports to become two major rivals to the US.
To address the fall in profitability in the real economy (the productive sphere), capital
shifted to unproductive investment in the financial sector (i.e., fictitious capital operations). That
is, the lack of investment in the productive sector due to a chronic lack of aggregate demand led
to financialization in the US and other major Western economies, not the other way around9.
Marxist scholars suggested that it was stagnation that generated financialization as capital
responded to the decline in profitability in the real economy, moving to the financial sector to
seek a higher profit rate. However, as noted above, financialization plays a contradictory role in
the economy, helping capital accumulation while also undermining it by causing periodic
financial crises (Orhangazi 2011; 2016). According to Fine, financialization is a phase of
neoliberalism rather than a new stage of capitalism (Fine 2009, 2010). In this new phase of
neoliberalism, monopoly-finance capital has responded to stagnation by expanding its coverage
toward new areas, such as insurance and pension systems, by means of the predator state, both in
the US and across the world (Galbraith 2008; Foster and McChesney 2012). In other words,
finance capital has expanded both at national and international level to redesign the global
economic order with the state’s political and military help (Lapavitsas 2013).
One argument that we based our empirical model on is the general Marxist perspective
suggesting that financialization is a response to economic sluggishness10. Therefore, the US
economy particularly started to rely on the financial sector along with persistent military
spending as two main stimuli to deal with sluggish economic growth and declining profitability
in the productive sector. In other words, based on Arrighi (1994), these two stimuli in the US are
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financialization in China goes hand in hand with high rates of profit and growth.
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this does not undermine the main hypothesis that this paper aims to test empirically – whether militarization and
financialization reinforce each other.
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not independent tools but mutually reinforcing. Therefore, we first discuss financialization and
then focus on the dialectic relationship between financialization and militarization.
The Dialectical Relationship between Financialization and Militarization
There is a dialectical relationship between financialization and militarization.
Financialization is a response to the stagnation due to underconsumption while militarization is
needed to impose financialization, thereby reinforcing each other in the US. Below, we discuss
why militarization is a key aspect of financialization in the US. Arrighi (1994) and others have
pointed out the mutually reinforcing nexus of financialization and militarization as a contribution
to an anthropology of political economy (Hart and Ortiz 2008; cited in Røyrvik 2010). The close
link between declining hegemonic power and financialization has been discussed extensively
(Braudel 1981; Germain 1997; Langley 2002; Wallerstein 2004; Harvey 2003; Steinmetz 2005;
Martin 2007; cited in Karataşlı and Kumral 2013: 42 and Beck and Knafo 2020: 139).
Following Braudel (1981), Giovanni Arrighi (1994) argued that, throughout the history of
capitalism, the decline of hegemons is associated with financial expansion11. As Hobson’s
analysis suggests, in hegemons, capital shifts from the real economy to fictitious capital
operations and to war-making activities, both as a consequence of and to slow the decline of
political and economic power (Arrighi 1994; Arrighi and Silver 1999). Meanwhile, emerging
economies use their competitive advantage to increase their share in the world economy.
However, as global trade and development hit their limits, big capitalists turn to speculative
financial markets, investing in unproductive sectors in response to the decline in profitability.
Capitalists in dominant economic centers can exploit their power in the global economy as a
taxing mechanism. That is, they can use financial flows to extract wealth from weaker players
(Beck and Knafo 2020).

11

This paper does not deal with this argument per se. We acknowledge that the decline of all hegemons cannot be

associated with financialization. Moreover, with respect to the US, due to its global fiat currency, the US
Hegemony’s B-phase, to use Arrighi’s conceptual framework, does not necessarily constitute a decline of US power
in the world-system. Rather, our hypothesis is that financialization and militarization reinforce each other to
maintain US economic and political power, regardless of whether it is declining or not.
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The key point in Arrighi’s analysis is that financialization is a product of power and can
only be sustained so long as there are significant economic imbalances between major countries
and peripheral countries. These originated in the establishment of three institutions of the Bretton
Woods established after World War II: namely the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. As the leading power, the US designed the
structure of capitalist global economy while these institutions in return reinforced US economic
hegemony by making it the enforcer of the rules of the game. Meanwhile, developing countries
became caught in a debt trap (Magdoff 1969: 50), creating a permanent economic imbalance that
favored the US. In other words, the steady financial expansion in the US economy was due to the
role of the dollar in the global economy that was significantly advantageous to the US.
The unique role of dollar is also closely linked to US military power. As Andre Gunder
Frank has succinctly argued, “Uncle Sam’s power rests on two pillars only, the paper dollar and
Pentagon” (Frank 2005), although he also noted that “[e]ach supports the other, but the
vulnerability of each is also an Achilles’ heel that threatens the viability of the other” (Frank
2005 cited in Meyerson and Roberto 2010: 174-75). Similarly, Magdoff argues that “[t]he
positioning of U.S. military bases should therefore be judged not as a purely military
phenomenon, but as a mapping out of the U.S. dominated imperial sphere and of its spearheads
within the periphery” (Magdoff 1969: 50).
Foster (2006:17) notes that “[if] neoliberalism had arisen in response to economic
stagnation, transferring the costs of economic crisis to the world’s poor, the problem of declining
U.S. economic hegemony scented to require an altogether different response—the reassertion of
U.S. power as military colossus of the world system”. In this sense, David Harvey contends that
the goal of the US in Iraq invasion was “a full-fledged neoliberal state apparatus whose
fundamental mission is to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation”12 (Harvey
12

In fact, as Harvey noted, the war transformed Iraq into one of the world’s most neo-liberalized economies

(Herrera 2013). Of course, Iraq is not the only example of forcible liberalization. The same strategy has been
pursued in Arab socialist or Islamic countries, implementing the neo-liberal agenda to open domestic markets to
foreign companies, and export low-priced commodities to Western markets (Galbraith, 2004: 299). Moreover, the
hegemonic stability theory suggests that the objective of US military policy globally goes beyond securing a
business-friendly environment or providing security for US-based corporations. Rather, it functions as a core means
of global order. The theory, introduced by Keohane (1980; 1984) but based on Kindleberger (1973), contends that
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2005: 8). In fact, it is no secret that the US has “a strategy of retaining its economic and political
hegemony through military means”, as reported in the National Security Strategy of the United
States in 2002 (Foster 2005:1). Thus, the goal in Iraq went beyond simply controlling oil
reserves to protecting the dollar’s dominant role, as made clear by a member of Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s Office of Special Plans, “who noted that the invasion was
undertaken in part to secure the dollar as Saddam Hussein and others were in the process of
switching from the dollar to the Euro to price their oil” (Clark 2005 cited in Meyerson and
Roberto 2010: 174).
The dollar’s hegemony as the global economy’s dominant currency (i.e., the world’s
reserve currency) is due to the Bretton Woods dollar-gold regime, which allows the US serve as
the world’s leading creditor. Since the US can supply dollars if needed simply by printing them,
it need not worry about trade deficits or facing a currency collapse. Since the dollar is the reserve
currency and has military “protection”13 from the US, other nations use it to trade with each
other as they need to obtain dollars to purchase oil14. Finally, some of those dollars circulate back
to the US economy as other nations invest in US stocks or treasury bonds. While in the short
term, this financial system substantially benefitted US businesses “because large dollar holdings
in foreign hands helped to facilitate the sale of U.S. exports”, in the long run, the decline in
profitability and the rise of Japan and West Germany led to “the end of the U.S. role as a leading

“global economic health” is “dependent on the presence of a single dominant power”. US hegemonic power, as the
single dominant power, establishes and maintains a stable global order necessary for a stable global economy. Thus,
military power essential to access and control resources to dominate markets, thereby ensuring the smooth
functioning of the U.S. economy.
13

The role of the US is to racketeer the third world countries just like the Mafia “claims money off clients to protect

them against a danger that is, in fact the Mafia itself” (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001; Røyrvik 2010: 10). US foreign
policy was quick to adopt a new enemy, global terrorism, to pursue this protection role to maintain its economic
hegemony by political means and military force.
14

This is in line with the Cartalist (or Chartalist) view of money, which “emphasize that money has definite social

and political conditions of existence” (Fields and Vernengo 2012:6). This approach suggests that “it is the power of
state, rather than the confidence of the markets, that is essential for the moneyness of a particular asset”, which holds
for the dollar as the international currency as well (ibid, 8).
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global exporter of industrial goods” (Brenner 2006: 125; cited Meyerson and Roberto 2010:
166).
The hardship for the US economy in terms of the imbalance in the positions of the dollar
(i.e., a drain in gold reserves) intensified with the US defeat in Vietnam as the flow of dollars
abroad created a huge Euro-dollar market (Clark 2005; Wallerstein 2003; Foster 2005; Meyerson
and Roberto 2010). This led to the end of the dollar-gold regime when Nixon delinked the dollar
from gold in 1971 de facto and in 1973 officially (D’Arista 2009). This is considered as the
beginning of the decline of US economic hegemony (Foster 2006), which was supposed to be
cured by financialization. The oil shock in 1973 led to a vast flow of petrodollars into the oilproducing states, which in turn flowed back to the US, mostly via American banks. This was a
new phase of US economic hegemony. “The process of petrodollar recycling underpins the U.S.’s
economic domination that funds its military supremacy. Dollar/petrodollar supremacy allowed the
U.S. a unique ability to sustain yearly current account deficits, pass huge tax cuts, build a massive
military empire of bases, and still have others accept its currency as medium of exchange for their
imported goods and services” (Clark 2005: 28, quoted in Meyerson and Roberto 2010: 167). For
the first time in history, a hegemon, the U.S., had the ability to be a global debtor to provide a
default-risk-free asset to facilitate global capital accumulation (Fields 2015:146). In other words,
the US as the hegemon, has served as the source of global stability, a lender of last resort, and
equally important the source of global demand15 (Fields and Vernengo 2012).
Financialization intensified under the neoliberal paradigm, which promoted flexible
exchange rates, free trade, and liberalizing capital accounts to expand toward developing
countries, perpetuating the power of finance capital. While financialization is a global process it
has varied between developed and developing countries so as to subordinate the latter to the
former (Lapavitsas 2013). In this hierarchical financial system, funds recycle back to the US
from developing countries through different channels, such as “repatriation of profits from
15

Fields and Vernengo note that hegemony is more a reflection of providing an asset that is free from the risk of

default to spur global accumulation. Although gold served as the reference category, it was more a means of
regulating exchange rates when Bretton Woods was in force. Therefore, when this regime fell, they argue, US power
was strengthened rather than weakened because the dollar became a global fiat currency (Fields and Vernengo
2012).
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foreign direct investments or from portfolio investments, repayment of external debts, and
transformation of official reserves into credits” (Herrera 2013: 162). Foster and McChesney
(2012) succinctly discuss the interdependence between the South and the North as the surplus
created in the South through extremely low wages can only be consumed in the North.16 Even as
most of the value created in developing countries goes to the North, the developing countries
remain more prone to macroeconomic risk (Bonizzi et al. 2020). As profits are realized by
exporters in emerging capitalist economies, domestic demand may be constrained, limiting
prospects for profitable investment, leading non-financial firms and wealthy people to invest in
financial markets, just like in developed economies. There is evidence that non-financial firms
have amassed an increasing share of assets in financial investments, mostly at the expense of
fixed capital formation (Demir 2007; Correa et al. 2012; Seo et al. 2012; Karwowski 2015; Tori
and Onaran 2017; cited in Bonizzi et al. 2020; 181).
Although wages have been stagnant in the North, particularly in the US, consumption has
been boosted with increased borrowing and using up personal savings. This was “made possible
by the infusion of capital from abroad, itself encouraged by the hegemony of the dollar” (Foster
2008: 1). Furthermore, finance capital has imposed the very same addiction to high consumption
by means of borrowing and promoted domestic financial markets, and aggressively attacked
social welfare institutions (such as the health and education sector) to open up them for local and
international private sector by means of the predator state (Galbraith 2008). This is part of what
Harvey (2005) has labeled “accumulation by dispossession”, creating profit rather than wealth
for the capital groups (in most cases, those that have close organic ties with the government) by
exploiting public sources.17

16

Milberg (2008) and Milberg & Winkler (2010) argue that US companies have earned higher profits due to the

mark-ups generated from their powerful role in global value chains, allowing them to maintain financialization by
freeing up capital for financial investments. Another economic imbalance between developed and developing
countries is that while the former basically fund themselves in domestic financial markets and currencies, the latter
has to borrow in foreign currency, becoming more vulnerable to risk caused by currency volatility (Bonizzi et al.
2020: 179-80).
17

James K. Galbraith has argued that in the era of financial neoliberalism, capitalists aimed for “complete control of

the apparatus of the state” (Galbraith 2008: 131), where the government “became little more than an alliance of
representatives from the regulated sectors—mining, oil, media, pharmaceuticals, corporate agriculture—seeking to
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With its absolute control over technology and communications, and by means of military
power, financial capital has been able to sustain such a drain of capital from the South to the
North, particularly the US (Klein 2007; Foster and McChesney 2012; Herrera 2013).
Militarization of production is indispensable for global finance capital because it is a major
source of profits and an extremely useful tool to reproduce itself by protecting and expanding
markets18. Finance capital increased its power over the military sector by buying stock in giant
arms corporations to become a major component of the military industrial complex. Herrera
(2013) provides valuable information in this regard: “At the beginning of the 2000s, the
proportion controlled by finance capital reached 95.0 per cent of the capital of Lockheed Martin,
86.5 per cent of that of Engineered Support Systems, 85.9 per cent for Stewart & Stevenson
Services, 84.7 per cent for L-3 Communications, 82.8 per cent for Northrop Grumman, 76.0 per
cent for General Dynamics, 70.0 per cent for Raytheon, 66.0 per cent for Titan, 65.0 per cent for
Boeing, etc.” (Herrera 2013: 170). As the neoliberal paradigm reinforces privatization in the
‘defense sector’, finance capital also increases its share by taking this outsourced defense
business (Cicchini and Herrera 2008; Herrera 2013).
Finally, Nölke provides an excellent discussion on the role of financialization in
degrading democracy. That is, financialization leads to higher military spending by overcoming
objections by weakening democratic structures in the developing countries, thereby helping the
interests of the global military financial industrial complex (Nölke 2020).

bring the regulatory system entirely to heel” (ibid.131), seeing “the economic activities of the government not in the
ideological terms but merely as opportunities for private profit on a continental scale” (ibid. 131).
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Serfati shows that certain banks¸ known as the ‘armament banks’ were involved in arms production and trade,

funded the large arms producing companies (Engelbrecht and Hanighen 1934; cited in Serfati 2020:206). Moreover,
he notes that, in contrast to one’s expectation, banks (English, French, and German) contributed to the
internationalization of the industry by funding competitor arms companies in other countries, acting against
“national interests’, in (Lewinsohn 1935; Serfati 2019; cited in Serfati 2020:206).
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The Impact of Financialization on the Rate of Profit
Financialization is a response to the crisis of accumulation due to underconsumption or
the tendency of profit rates to decline.19 This subsection briefly discusses the relationship
between militarization and financial profit rate.
The third volume of Das Kapital focused on the financial sphere of a capitalist economy.
Marx examined the critical role of credit and financial speculation in capital accumulation,
foreseeing the rise of the financial sector, and the centralization and concentration of capital
(Roberts 2018). For Marx, financial investment was a counteracting factor to the tendency of the
rate of profit to fall. Although credit helps to boost trade, its effect is limited because when the
rate of exploitation of labor begins to decline, credits cannot be repaid. Against this background,
some have analyzed financialization as a counteracting factor to the tendency of the rate of profit
to fall, along with other counteracting factors originally noted by Marx and Engels20 (Giacché
2011; Guillén 2014; Mavroudeas and Papadatos 2018; Ramirez 2019; Di Bucchianico 2020).
Financialization keeps aggregate demand high despite stagnant real wages by easing
borrowing and creating wealth through increases in prices in the housing market. This in turn
prevents the rate of profit from falling while opening up new investment opportunities in the
financial sphere. Finally, financialization generates opportunities to earn money by speculating.
Investigating the various channels through which financialization impacts the rate of profit, Di
Bucchianico (2020) found effects due to technical innovations in the financial sector, the size of
the financial sector in terms of its share in total profits and GDP, and rising household
indebtedness. In addition, socio-political factors that reduce workers’ bargaining power also had

19

The tendency for the rate of profit to fall is perhaps one of the most controversial issues in Marxist thought. There

has been a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature that discusses the issues in three layers (Elveren 2019: 50):
the tendency for the falling rate of profit in Marx’s thinking; measuring the rate of profit – perhaps the least
controversial area; and empirical studies of the sources of change in the rate of profit.
20

In volume III of Das Kapital there are four countertendencies noted, namely raising the intensity of exploitation,

depression of wages, cheapening the elements of constant capital, and foreign trade. Marx originally noted six
counteracting factors. The two extra are the calculation of the rate of profit and ‘relative overpopulation’, related to
depression of wages (Elveren 2019: 61).
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a significant effect on the normal rate of profit. However, it is important to distinguish between
the normal rate of profit (or non-financial profit rate) and the financial profit rate.
Bakir and Campbell (2010: 325) note that, from a Marxist perspective, financial profits
are simply a transfer of part of the total profits to the financial sector. That is, profits are created
in the real economy (i.e., productive capital), and such a transfer may theoretically have positive
or negative effect on accumulation. On the one hand, it is a subtraction from the capital
accumulation because “net interest payments to the financial sector from the non-financial sector
are deductions from the produced profit that is available for productive reinvestment and
accumulation” (ibid. 326). On the other hand, financial profits may increase the rate of
accumulation by improving the conditions for further accumulation (Bakir and Campbell 2010:
325). In other words, Marx argues in the third volume of Das Kapital that credit does not create
profits directly but improves the conditions to earn higher profits. The expansion of credit can
accelerate the process of capital concentration. In terms of the circuit of capital model, the
expansion of credit shortens the ‘turnover of capital’, thereby reducing finance lag (Foley 1982).
Bakir and Campbell (2010) claim that, in financial capitalism, a smaller portion of profits was reinvested in the productive sphere of the economy because corporations were forced to pay
significant fees for the money they borrowed from the financial sector, which otherwise would
have been redirected to productive investment, causing a decline in the rate of accumulation.
Only a few studies have measured the financial rate of profit (Duménil and Lévy 2004;
Bakir and Campbell 2013; Freeman 2012). Freeman shows that when financialization is taken
into account, the corrected rate of profit exhibits a consistent long-run fall in the US and UK.
Because it would be illogical to assume that monetary assets are capital in the hands of a bank
but not in the hands of a company in the non-financial sector, one should also consider
ownership of financial assets in calculating the profit rate for non-financial sector (Freeman
2012). Therefore, Freeman suggests adding medium- and long-run marketable assets to the
denominator of the profit rate. Following such an alteration, the profit rate for the US and UK
shows a steady decline up to the 1980s instead of a recovery as the traditional method suggests.
Bakir and Campbell (2013) provide three measures of the financial rate of profit: the
Weisskopf rate of profit, the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) rate of profit, and
the augmented rate of profit. They identify five major patterns:
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1) The financial rate of profit has completely returned to its pre-1960s’ levels.
2) The volatility in the augmented profit rate has increased since the 1990s.
3) The “Weisskopf” and “NIPA” rates of profit are only rough proxies for the augmented rate of
profit.
4) The financial rate of profit is significantly higher than the non-financial rate of profit.
5) Under neoliberalism, recovery and growth were stronger for the financial rate of profit than
the nonfinancial rate of profit (Bakir and Campbell 2013: 299-300).
As discussed above, military spending has been used as a stimulus to overcome chronic
lack of aggregate demand, chronic stagnation problem due to underconsumption, and
overaccumulation. Some studies have empirically analyzed the impact of military spending on
the rate profit from a Marxist perspective (Elveren and Hsu 2016; Elveren 2019). Elveren (2019),
in a comprehensive study, showed that while military expenditure counteracted the decline in the
rate of profit throughout 1950-2014, the effect was not significant during the neoliberal era. He
also noted that the counteracting effect holds for arms-exporting countries but not armsimporting countries. Moreover, using an adapted circuit of capital model, proposed by Foley
(1982), he showed that a larger share of military sector is associated with a higher rate of profit
as the finance lag is smaller in the military sector21. Elveren (2020) provided empirical evidence
for this proposition. However, as we discussed, the pattern of the financial rate of profit differs
from the normal rate of profit (i.e., the non-financial profit rate). To distinguish the difference
between the two definitions of profit, financial and non-financial, and to reveal their mutual
connection with militarization, a comprehensive statistical and empirical analysis will follow in
the next section.

21

The model includes five key parameters: the proportion of surplus value recommitted to production, the mark-up

over costs, and the production, realization, and finance lags. The production lag is the average number of periods
required for an atom of value in capital outlay to be turned into a finished product. The realization lag shows how
many periods are required to turn value as finished products into sales flow. Finally, “finance lag represents how
many periods are required on average to turn value as sales flows into new capital outlay” (Foley 1982; Elveren
2020:6).
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3. Data and Method
Our empirical analysis uses financialization and militarization indicators in the U.S. since
it is the ‘best’ representative of the capitalist mode of production and there is a wide literature on
its transformation as a financialization center and military power. But an empirical link between
the two processes is still not covered in depth. We used yearly data from 1949 to 2019, which is
the longest possible time series available. The indicators of financialization and militarization
were selected based on the previous literature. The descriptions of the data are presented in Table
1.
Table 1: Data and Descriptions for Financialization and Militarization (1949-2019)
Series
Finprof
Nonfinprof
fin_nonfinprof
int_gdp
divid_gdp
pr_general
pr_corrected
pr_nipa
pr_weisskopf
pr_augmented

Definition
Source
Financial profits (in millions of US$)
NIPA
Nonfinancial profits (in millions of US$)
NIPA
Ratio of financial profits to nonfinancial profits
NIPA
Ratio of net interest to Gross Domestic Product
NIPA
Ratio of Net dividends to Gross Domestic Product
NIPA
Freeman’s general profit rate
Freeman (2012)
Freeman’s corrected profit rate
Freeman (2012)
Bakir&Campbell’s ‘NIPA’ Profit Rate
Bakir & Campbell (2013)
Bakir&Campbell’s ‘Weisskopf’ Profit Rate
Bakir & Campbell (2013)
Bakir & Campbell’s ‘Augmented’ Profit Rate
Bakir & Campbell (2013)
Military expenditure at current prices and exchange
Milex
SIPRI
rates (in millions of US$)
Ratio of military expenditure at current prices to
milex_gdp
SIPRI
Gross Domestic Product
Notes: All variables are expressed in millions of dollars. The ratios are calculated accordingly. NIPA and
SIPRI correspond to National Income and Product Accounts and Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute. Freeman’s calculations are updated by the authors.

To measure financialization, we used various definitions of financial profits, together
with interest and dividends as a ratio of gross domestic product. In her comprehensive literature
survey, Davis (2017) presents empirical definitions of financialization, which reveals that these
three measures as the most commonly used indicators in the literature. Additionally, we used the
two profit rates calculated by Freeman (2012) and the three profit rates by Bakir and Campbell
(2013). To measure militarization, we used military expenditure and the ratio of military
expenditure to gross domestic product. Although militarization and militarism refer to different
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aspects of the same process, it is not uncommon to use them interchangeably22. Militarism is a
much broader concept than militarization in that the latter refers to only one aspect of the former,
namely the increase in military spending. However, we acknowledge that it is not easy to
operationalize militarism, so it is appropriate for our purposes in this study to limit our focus to
militarization measured by military expenditure. The summary statistics for the overall data are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Data
Series
finprof
nonfinprof
fin_nonfinprof
int_gdp
divid_gdp
pr_general
pr_corrected
pr_nipa
pr_weisskopf
pr_augmented
milex
milex_gdp

N
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71

Mean
126,429.30
391,619.20
24.86
3.89
3.52
19.49
7.18
19.34
12.01
4.81
273,918.80
6.03

St. Dev.
152,032.30
405,867.80
11.48
1.94
1.31
3.55
2.12
9.02
3.86
13.27
233,899.70
2.49

Min
3,055.00
24,840.00
8.70
0.94
2.28
14.07
4.19
-5.88
2.25
-51.52
14,088.16
3.10

Max
462,028.00
1,306,353.00
58.24
7.96
6.74
28.29
12.00
33.25
19.30
20.23
752,288.00
13.52

To form the empirical model correctly, the characteristics of the data need to be
determined using appropriate statistical tests. As the data set is a rather long time series, we first
tested for non-stationarity. The outcomes in Table 3 reveal that all variables are integrated at
order one.

22

For example, while Peterson and Runyan (1999: 258) define militarization as “processes by which

characteristically military practices are extended into the civilian arena”, Stavrianakis and Selby (2013:1) define
militarism as “the social and international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political
violence”.
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Table 3: Testing for Stationarity
Differences
ADF
p-value
3
-1.75
0.673
finprof
-6.34
0.010
3
-1.24
0.884
nonfinprof
-5.94
0.010
fin_nonfinprof
3
-2.05
0.310
-5.02
0.010
int_gdp
3
-1.60
0.484
-4.05
0.010
divid_gdp
3
0.990
1.08
-4.43
0.010
pr_general
3
-2.87
0.058
-4.52
0.010
pr_corrected
3
-2.70
0.084
-4.07
0.010
pr_nipa
3
-1.22
0.616
-5.21
0.010
pr_weisskopf
3
-2.48
0.145
-4.78
0.010
pr_augmented
3
0.990
1.68
-3.52
0.012
3
-2.41
0.400
milex
-3.63
0.010
milex_gdp
3
-2.64
0.094
-4.56
0.010
Notes: ADF refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root.
Series

lag

ADF

Level
p-value

Order of
Integration
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

After conducting the unit root analysis, the empirical time series literature mostly uses
cointegration methods to find the parameters explaining the overall structure. While such
parametric models are quite common, they rely on several critical underlying assumptions, with
linearity being the most important and restrictive. If the true data-generating process does not
satisfy these assumptions, the results are misleading since the estimated coefficients become
biased and inconsistent. Thus, unless it can be shown that a linear functional form between the
dependent variable and the covariates holds globally, parametric models are not the best choice.
We therefore conducted statistical tests for possible nonlinearity in the model. There are
numerous test statistics used in the literature based on distinct nonlinearity structures expressed
by different null and alternative hypothesis. The neural network test of Teraesvirta and Granger
(1993) and the White neural network test for nonlinearity (Lee, White and Granger, 1993) both
test for the null hypothesis of linearity in the mean while the latter is also consistent with
arbitrary nonlinearity in the mean. Keenan’s one-degree test for nonlinearity (Keenan, 1985)
compares departures from the linear autoregressive (AR) model against the square of the AR
function while Tsay’s test for nonlinearity (Tsay, 1986) similarly assesses quadratic nonlinearity
in a time series. The difference is that Tsay’s test incorporates the cross products of covariates,
which increases the power of the test statistic. Finally, Chan’s (1991) likelihood ratio test for
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threshold nonlinearity uses the null hypothesis of AR process and the alternative hypothesis is
specified as the threshold autoregressive process.
In particular, we are interested in a possible Bayesian structure as suggested by the initial
statistical and graphical analysis, which will be described in the next section. Hence, we used the
Teraesvirta and White neural network test with the null hypothesis of linearity in the mean. The
results are presented in Table 4. The results of the other possible nonlinearity tests are also
provided for cross-checking23.
Table 4: Testing for Nonlinearity
Teraesvirta
White
Keenan
Tsay
LR
ChipChipppChipF
Series
sq
value
sq
value
value
F
value
sq
value
finprof
2.11
0.348
1.79
0.408
1.43 0.235 1.53
0.22
8.63
0.128
nonfinprof
4.47
0.107
4.45
0.108
3.01 0.088 3.96 0.051
8.17
0.148
fin_nonfinprof
2.54
0.280
1.04
0.594
0.56 0.456 0.56 0.455 12.00 0.038
int_gdp
0.04
0.983
0.04
0.980
0.24 0.623 0.30 0.826
8.79
0.209
divid_gdp
4.43
0.109
4.59
0.101
3.24 0.077 2.00 0.123
6.73
0.309
pr_general
1.62
0.445
1.85
0.396
0.00 0.958 2.75 0.020
7.74
0.324
pr_corrected
2.61
0.271
2.60
0.272
0.62 0.434 0.68 0.413
4.43
0.337
pr_nipa
37.40 0.000 33.50 0.000 19.04 0.000 19.10 0.000 27.44 0.000
pr_weisskopf
25.54 0.000 18.14 0.000 11.05 0.001 11.06 0.001 20.95 0.001
pr_augmented
9.61
0.008 10.57 0.005
8.14 0.006 9.71 0.003 13.67 0.019
milex
13.25 0.001
7.57
0.023
2.91 0.093 4.92
0.03
33.79 0.000
milex_gdp
1.40
0.497
1.15
0.562
0.02 0.897 2.07 0.070 22.14 0.004
Notes: Teraesvirta's neural network test: H0=Linearity in the mean
White neural network test: H0=Linearity in the mean
Keenan’s one-degree test for nonlinearity: H0=The time series follows some AR process
Tsay's Test for nonlinearity: H0=The time series follows some AR process
Likelihood ratio test for threshold nonlinearity: H0=The time series follows some AR process.
H1=The time series follows some TAR process

The nonlinearity test results show that profit rates provided by Bakir and Campbell and
the military expenditure data exhibit nonlinearity in the mean. For financial profits and nonfinancial profits, the test results do not reject the null hypotheses of AR process while the unit
root tests already showed that financial profits and non-financial profits are nonstationary. As for
the ratio of financial to nonfinancial profits and military expenditure to GDP, the neural network
tests show linearity in mean, but the LR statistic suggests evidence of a threshold autoregressive
23

The nonlinear time series analysis was carried out using the package “nonlinearTseries” in R statistical software.
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process. Finally, net interests and dividends as a ratio of GDP and the Freeman profit rates show
linearity in the mean. In sum, the non-stationarity and nonlinearity test results for our
financialization and militarization indicators necessitate an empirical model that is flexible
enough to handle nonlinear mean relationships.
We used nonparametric methods for dealing with these complexities in the empirical
model. Nonparametric methods provide flexible tools as they avoid assumptions regarding the
functional form of the regression equation, including linearity. Instead, the functional form of the
relationship can vary locally over the range of covariates in the model. Such methods also
provide a more comprehensive framework as they incapsulate the linear model as a limiting
condition. As an intermediary solution, semiparametric models combine parametric and
nonparametric techniques. The estimation of these models is essentially nonparametric, although
some covariates are allowed to be parametric. Such hybrid approaches are especially useful if the
model contains categorical variables that can only be included parametrically because their
functional form is specified intrinsically.
Generalized Additive Models (GAMs), which can be applied as either a nonparametric or
semiparametric tool, outperform the linear parametric models by relaxing two critical
assumptions. The early Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) of Nelder and Wedderburn (1972)
offer an expansion by allowing non-normal error distributions. This means that the ordinary least
squares (OLS) method is no longer appropriate for estimating GLMs, so iteratively reweighted
least squares (IRLS) are used instead. As a further extension, Hastie and Tibshirani (1990)
relaxed the global functional form assumption in GAMs, which directly confronts the possibility
of nonlinearity24. While the model structure of GAMs was quite appealing initially, estimating
the complexity of these models has remained a challenge until the necessary computational tools
were developed. Recently, however, researchers have developed powerful statistical software for
dealing with this issue, so the model has become even more functional.
Typically, GAM can be specified as follows (Wood, 2017: 249):

24

Beck and Jackman (1998) provide a rigorous discussion about going beyond linearity.
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𝑔(𝜇! ) = 𝐴! 𝛾 + ∑#" 𝑓" (𝑥"! )

(1)

where 𝐴! is the parametric model matrix and 𝑓" is a smooth function of covariates. The
dependent variable 𝑦! is assumed to be a member of the exponential family distribution
𝐸𝐹(𝜇! , ɸ) with mean 𝐸2𝑦3𝑥$ , … 𝑥# 5. This model is semi-parametric in the presence of the
parametric component 𝐴! . If, on the other hand, 𝐴! does not appear in the model, GAM becomes
entirely nonparametric. Under these circumstances, the whole function is based on the so-called
smoothing splines 𝑓" .
The estimation of the model is based on finding the optimal parameter set, with a tradeoff calling for a balance between two aims. On the one hand, the fitted model should capture the
true data-generating process by being close enough to the data. This is typically measured by the
likelihood. On the other hand, the fitted model should reveal the complexity or nonlinearity
inherent in the data. This complexity is explained by how much the fitted curve changes its shape
– a measure known as wiggliness. It should be exactly the right amount needed to avoid fitting
the noise in the model, i.e. over-fitting the data. Thus, the estimation is carried out by
maintaining this delicate balance. The wiggliness of the model is mathematically incorporated
through the spline functions, which are composed of simpler functions called basis functions.
When we model using splines, each basis function 𝑏% has a coefficient 𝛽% . The resultant spline is
the sum of these weighted basis functions:
𝑓(𝑥) = ∑% 𝛽% 𝑏% (𝑥)

(2)

The term in the summation introduces complexity into the model through wiggliness,
which needs to be controlled. To avoid overfitting the model, we penalize this term, with the
penalty measured by the smoothness parameter denoted by 𝜆. This estimation method is then
based on maximizing the following penalized log-likelihood:
$

𝑙# (𝛽) = 𝑙(𝛽) − &ɸ ∑" 𝜆𝛽 ( 𝑆" 𝛽

(3)

where the first component, the log-likelihood 𝑙(𝛽), measures closeness to the data and the second
component, ∑" 𝜆𝛽 ( 𝑆" 𝛽 , is the smoothing penalty for wiggliness, with the penalty matrix defined
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by S. Solving the optimization problem during estimation, we choose the appropriate smoothness
parameter 𝜆 for each covariate in the model.
Several smoothness selection criteria can be used for the estimation25. In this paper, we
used the approach known as empirical Bayes. The basic idea of this method can be summarized
as follows. We took the smoothing penalties to be represented by a Gaussian prior on the model
coefficients and then we maximized the Bayesian log marginal likelihood. This approach departs
from a fully Bayesian approach in that the latter puts a prior on 𝜆 before obtaining the
corresponding posterior density. Our empirical Bayes approach, based on a Restricted Maximum
Likelihood (REML) procedure, provided robust results, as discussed in the next section.
4. Empirical Results and Discussion
In this study, we used nonparametric GAM estimations to empirically evaluate the three
main approaches regarding the link between financialization and militarization, outlined above.
First, we consider a generic model for financialization and militarization, to gain an initial idea
about the co-movement of the two indicators. This discussion does not yield any causal
relationship between the two indicators but potentially reflects the relationship between
financialization and militarization as a response to the economic conjuncture. Second, we
investigate how financialization and militarization affect each other. To do so, we control for the
effect of gross domestic product as an underlying factor before obtaining a model of how the two
variables respond to each other. Hence, this part provides a discussion on the dialectical link
between financialization and militarization. Third, we discuss the Marxist analysis of declining
profit rates in relation to military expenditure. We employ different definitions of the profits
rates in Freeman (2012) and Bakir and Campbell (2013), and investigate their link with
militarization.

25

The interested readers can refer to Wood (2017) Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of smoothers.
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Financialization and Militarization as Potential Response Variables
Starting with the most generic form of the model to understand the characteristics of
financialization and militarization, we look first at financial profits and military expenditure.
Figure 1 shows that financial and nonfinancial profits increased after the neoliberal transformation.
Nonfinancial profits, which still represent the larger portion of total corporate profits, experienced
more volatility after 1980 whereas financial profits increased more slowly and steadily, except for
the financial collapse during the mortgage crisis in 2008-2009. Even in 2001, when nonfinancial
profits declined, financial profits were relatively stable. Moreover, this rise in financial profits
paralleled the upsurge in the military expenditure with even more accelerated amounts.
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Figure 1: Indicators of Profits and Military Expenditure
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Following the initial observation about the simultaneous rise in financial profits and
military expenditure, we need to uncover the potential linkages between the two indicators. There
are possible scenarios. First, the two indicators may be correlated in the long run. As the military
expenditure data exhibits nonlinearity, this can only be demonstrated by a nonlinear cointegration
test. Second, the two indicators may be not only correlated but also causally linked. The possibility
of univariate/bivariate causality can be tested using nonlinear Granger causality tests. Following a
nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) type of specification, the two nonlinear causality
tests by Hiemstra and Jones (1994) and Kyrtsou and Labys (2006) can be used for these purposes.
Third, the most likely outcome is that both variables are responding to the growth in the economy.
In this case, without controlling for the effect of the underlying factor, the remaining risk of
25

estimating a spurious regression is not eliminated. In fact, the estimations of these generic models
exhibit unusually high coefficient of determination although the diagnostics of the models are not
satisfactory26. Thus, we revised our models for financialization and militarization by controlling
for the effect of the overall economic conjuncture, which can be proxied by the measure of GDP.
The Dialectics of Financialization and Militarization
The degree of financialization and militarization can be better described by taking the ratios
rather than the totals. Figure 2 displays the most frequently used measures for financial indicators
in the literature (see Davis, 2017) in conjunction with the ratio of military expenditure to GDP. It
appears that the rate of financial profits to nonfinancial profits generally increased apart from local
deviations. Military expenditure as a share of GDP, on the other hand, declined slightly before
1980 but remained relatively stable after that. Net interest and dividends as a ratio of GDP did not
vary much, which may not alter the overall pattern between the financialization and militarization.
Thus, when the ratio of financial to nonfinancial profits is used as a measure of financialization,
there is a roughly inverse relationship with the selected measure of militarization.
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Before constructing the formal model, we should identify the response variable and rule
out possible endogeneity in the model. The results of the Teraesvirta and White tests (Table 4)
indicate that all four variables are linear in the mean, which allows testing for usual Granger
26

The results of these generic models are presented in the Appendix.
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causality among them. Table 5 presents the results of the Granger causality tests. There is bivariate
causality between military expenditure as a ratio of GDP and financial profits as a ratio of
nonfinancial profits. However, there is no causality between military expenditure and the net
interests as a ratio of GDP or net dividends as a ratio of GDP.
Table 5: Testing for Linear Causality in Selected F&M Indicators
Specification Null Hypothesis
FM.1
milex_gdp does not cause fin_nonfinprof
fin_nonfinprof does not cause milex_gdp
FM.2
milex_gdp does not cause int_gdp
int_gdp does not cause milex_gdp
FM.3
milex_gdp does not cause divid_gdp
divid_gdp does not cause milex_gdp

lag
1
1
1
1
1
1

F
4.221
6.113
0.731
2.560
0.870
0.627

p-value
0.044
0.016
0.396
0.114
0.354
0.431

One caveat should be noted about nonparametric techniques. Their precision declines if
several explanatory variables are included in the model, which is known as the curse of
dimensionality (Härdle et al., 2004: 4). Moreover, additional covariates may have concurvity
even if they are not collinear, which implies that they may behave like smooth curves of each
other. In our financialization-militarization model, the ratio of financial profits displayed strong
concurvity with the ratios of net interest rates and dividends as the corresponding test values
were greater than 0.6 for each pair of variables. As these outcomes may affect the precision of
the estimates, we used univariate rather than multivariate GAM models27. Based on the bivariate
causality found in Table 5, we estimated the following financialization-militarization (FM)
models:
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𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) = 𝛼* + 𝑓$ (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) )

(FM.1)

𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) = 𝛽* + 𝑓$ (𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) )

(FM.2)

However, the presence or absence of these additional covariates do not change the overall relationship between the

ratio of financial to nonfinancial profits and militarization since the effect of interest rates and dividends are negligible
and do not follow a causal pattern. Interested readers can compare these results with those in the Appendix.
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Table 6 presents the estimation results for the FM.1 and FM.2 models28. The constant term,
which appears as a parametric component, is significant for both models. In both of our estimated
models, there are nine basis functions and the effective degrees of freedom (edf) are significant
and greater than one. The value of edf measures the complexity of the smoothness or wiggliness
in the estimation. If it is close to one, the estimated model is closer to a straight line whereas higher
edf values describe more wiggly curves.
Table 6: GAM Estimation Results of F&M Models
Dependent variable
milex_gdp
fin_nonfinprof
FM.1
FM.2
***
Constant
estimate
6.032
24.856***
std. err.
0.194
0.972
s(fin_nonfinprof)
see Figure 3
s(milex_gdp)
see Figure 4
Approximate significance and basis dimension of smooth terms
s(fin_nonfinprof)
edf
4.875
_
p-value
0.000
_
k
9
_
s(milex_gdp)
edf
_
2.633
p-value
_
0.000
k
_
9
Observations
71
71
Adjusted R2
0.569
0.491
Deviance
59.90%
51.00%
Explained
Log Likelihood
-139.437
-252.825
UBRE
140.852
248.72
Notes: (***) denotes significance at 1%. The values in parentheses are
p-values. Edf and k are effective degrees of freedom and basis
functions, respectively. UBRE denotes Unbiased Risk Estimator.

It is customary in nonparametric models to show the resultant smooths using plots rather
than printing the coefficients. This is because each smooth has several coefficients, one for each
basis functions. The estimated smooth curve of the FM.1 model presented in the left-hand panel
of Figure 3 demonstrates that, at the overall level, 𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) ratio as a financialization
measure has a nonlinear negative effect on the 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) ratio. However, there are some
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For all of the GAM estimations presented, we used R statistical software packages “mgcv” and “gratia”.
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exceptions where the curve is upward trending when 𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) has relatively small values
at the beginning and also when it reached a medium level.
The right-hand panel of Figure 3 presents the diagnostic results for the estimated FM.1
model. The quantile-quantile plot in the top-left graph compares the model residuals to a normal
distribution. It should be close to a straight line for a well-fitted model. The bottom-left graph
shows the histograms of the residuals, which should have a symmetrical bell shape. The top-right
plot displays the residual values, which should be evenly distributed around zero. Finally, the
bottom-right graph plots the response against the fitted values, which ideally should form a straight
line. All these overall diagnostics seem to be satisfactory for FM.1 model.
Figure 3: GAM Estimations for FM.1 Model

Figure 4 shows the results of the GAM estimation modelling the effect of
𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) on the 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) ratio. In this case, the considered financialization measure
has a negative effect on militarization. The diagnostics of the estimation given in the right-hand
panel outperform the FM.1 specification, especially in terms of normality and the fitted value
graphics.
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Figure 4: GAM Estimations for FM.2 Model

These results imply that militarization is negatively associated with the degree of
financialization when the financialization measures used – including the interest rates and
dividends – are selected from the previous literature. However, the interpretation of these two
models should be regarded with caution. Although the fact that financial profits increased more
quickly than nonfinancial profits indicates the degree of financialization, it is an ambitious measure
to assess overall financialization because we are observing acceleration rather than the increase
itself. In other words, when financial profits and non-financial profits and their corresponding
profit rates increase simultaneously, the ratio of financial to nonfinancial profits may still be
falling. Indeed, Figure 2 shows a rise in this accelerated measure. However, regarding the
association with the military expenditure as a ratio of GDP, we believe that financial profit rates
may better characterize the actual relationship.
Financial Profit Rates in Relation to Militarization: Freeman definitions
Freeman (2012) discusses two different definitions for profit rates tied up with
financialization. First, he discusses the general profit rate traditionally measured by most Marxist
scholars. This definition is calculated as a ratio of corporate value added with respect to corporate
capital stock. This has tended to rise since the 1970s. Freeman then presents a corrected measure
of the profit rates that includes financial securities in the denominator. After this adjustment, he
claims, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall become apparent in both the UK and US economies,
even after the 1980s. Our research question follows from this: Are these general or uncorrected
profit rates in the US economy also related to militarization of the country? Our initial observations
based on the graphical analysis of Figure 5 suggest that there may be such a correlation.
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The three indicators, namely the two profit rate definitions and military expenditure as a
ratio of GDP, seem to have a similar long-run pattern (Figure 5). However, we need to
demonstrate that the relationship is not spurious by applying linear cointegration analysis and
vector error correction models29. We do not go into details here for two reasons. First, the
likelihood ratio test suggested the possibility of threshold nonlinearity in the 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝
variable. Thus, we believe Bayesian inferences may more reliably detect the underlying
cointegrating pattern. Second, as we aim to provide an overall discussion on the profit rates
together with Bakir and Campbell’s specifications – which are in fact nonlinear in the mean, we
prefer the analyses to be comparable. Given that the empirical Bayesian model that we use here
works both with linear and nonlinear variables, we retain this method for the Freeman type profit
rates, although they are linear (Table 4).
Table 7 presents the causality test results regarding the patterns of correlation between
profit rates 𝑝𝑟_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 in relation to 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝,. They indicate univariate
causality running from the financialization measure using the Freeman-type (F) profit rates to the
measure of militarization 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝.
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Both the Johansen trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics show that there is cointegration between the
variables 𝑝𝑟_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 and 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝. The same test statistics also show evidence of cointegration between the
variables 𝑝𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 and 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝. The Johansen cointegration test is applied on the grounds that it is robust
against endogeneity in the regressors. The results can be provided on request.
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Table 7: Testing for Linear Causality in Financial Profit Rate Models (F)
Specification Null Hypothesis
F.1
milex_gdp does not cause pr_general
pr_general does not cause milex_gdp
F.2
milex_gdp does not cause pr_corrected
pr_corrected does not cause milex_gdp

lag
1
1
1
1

F
0.024
11.949
1.455
27.623

p-value
0.878
0.001
0.232
0.000

Thus, we specify the following two univariate models to determine the effect of financial
profit rates on militarization:
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) = 𝛼* + 𝑓$ (𝑝𝑟_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙)

(F.1)

𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) = 𝛽* + 𝑓$ (𝑝𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)

(F.2)

Table 8 presents the estimation results for the F.1 and F.2 models. Both smoothing
splines are significant with nine basis functions. The effective degrees of freedom indicate that
the general profit rates result in a wigglier curve whereas the Freeman-corrected profit rates
appear to be smooth.
Table 8: GAM Estimation Results of Financial Profit Rate Models (F)
Dependent variable: milex_gdp
F.1
F.2
***
Constant
estimate
6.032
6.032***
std. err.
0.194
0.164
See Figure 6
_
s(pr_general)
_
See Figure 7
s(pr_corrected)
Approximate significance and basis dimension of smooth terms
edf
4.298
_
s(pr_general)
p-value
0.000
_
k
9
_
edf
_
1.000
s(pr_corrected)
p-value
0.000
_
k
_
9
Observations
71
71
Adjusted R2
0.571
0.69
Deviance
59.70%
69.40%
Explained
Log Likelihood
-139.014
-125.902
UBRE
139.796
124.689
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Notes: (***) denotes significance at 1%. The values in parentheses
are p-values. Edf and k are effective degrees of freedom and basis
functions respectively. UBRE denotes Unbiased Risk Estimator.

Figures 6 and 7 show the resultant smooths for the estimated F.1 and F.2 models . At the
overall level, 𝑝𝑟_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙, which denotes the general profit rate definition commonly used in the
Marxist literature, is positively associated with the military expenditure/GDP ratio. This overall
pattern is not observed only for very small or very large profit rate levels, which is where the
Freeman correction comes into play. As the denominator is corrected via the inclusion of
securities in the 𝑝𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 rates, the profit rates become more representative of
financialization. Remarkably, after applying this adjustment to the profit rates, their effect on
militarization now becomes linear and positive throughout. Thus, when the Freeman-corrected
profit rates are used as a measure of financial instruments, the decline in this rate causes a
decline in military expenditure as a ratio of GDP.
Models specified with the corrected rates also exhibit better diagnostics than uncorrected
profit rates. Specifically, the residual histogram becomes closer to a normal distribution while
the fitted values become closer to the observed values, as can be seen from the right-hand panels
of Figures 6 and 7.
Figure 6: GAM Estimations for F.1 Model

Notes: Left-hand panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right-hand panel shows the diagnostics of the
estimations.
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Figure 7: GAM Estimations for F.2 Model

Notes: Left-hand panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right-hand panel shows the diagnostics of the
estimations.

Estimating financial profit rates using the Freeman definition provides interesting results.
Freeman (2012) argues that fictitious capital is also a form of capital that must be accounted for
when calculating the profit rate. Our analysis is in line with his results in that his corrected profit
rate calculation suggests a more coherent measure that better represents how profit rates are
changed by financialization. His basic hypothesis is that, after including this financial
component, profit rates continued to decline after the 1980s, unlike the general profit rates used
in the previous literature. He observes that “it smooths out some of the volatility in the
uncorrected rate before 1982” (p. 178). This smoother effect is observed also in our analysis
when the corrected and general profit rates are compared.
For both definitions of profit rates, the estimation results indicate a positive relationship
with military expenditure as a ratio of GDP. The causal relationship is now univariate and runs
from the profit rate definitions to the militarization indicators. A couple of observations are
needed regarding this critical results, in conjunction with the previous financializationmilitarization model. First, the graphical analysis in Figure 5 shows that the military
expenditure/GDP ratio tends to decline and declines more quickly than the Freeman-corrected
profit rates, which include financialization. In fact, Freeman notes that the “US economy has, for
the past 30-40 years, performed worse than at any time since the 1930s” (p. 168). The surplus
shared by capitalists has been shrinking, which leads to a decline in all expense items, including
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military expenditure. Under these conditions, the decline in the profit rates is inevitable and may
lead also to a decline in military expenditure as a ratio of GDP. Thus, the causality running from
the contracted profit rates to the military expenditure as a rate of GDP can be expected.
On the other hand, this may still be consistent with our earlier observations on the
acceleration of financialization. We found before that the ratio of financial profits to nonfinancial
profits is negatively associated with the ratio of military expenditure to GDP while the causality
was bivariate. This may also be due to current crises in the US capitalist system. Under these
crisis conditions, it is always easier to shift to unproductive sectors represented by financial
instruments. Thus, when all expenditure is shrinking – including military expenditure – we may
observe an escape to unproductive capital, leading to an overall rise in the degree of
financialization measured by the ratio of financial profits to nonfinancial profits. In other words,
the acceleration in financialization may be accompanied by a fall in the Freeman-corrected profit
rates. The uncorrected profit rates, on the other hand, may have an erratic pattern, as shown by
the nonlinear pattern observed in our model (Figure 6). This explains why Dunne et al. (2013)
and Elveren (2019) found that military spending has a less significant impact on the general rate
of profit rate. For instance, using four different general rates of profit covering different time
periods, Elveren (2019) found that only one of the rates had a significant relationship (but only at
the 10-percent level) with militarization in the U.S. As discussed earlier, the general Marxist
argument is that capital shifts to unproductive sectors in response to the capital accumulation
problem, thereby increasing the share of financial profits in total profits. An increase in the
financial profits/nonfinancial profits ratio reflects this trend, which is accompanied by a decline
in the Freeman-corrected profit rate and Bakir and Campbell’s rates. Therefore, an increase in
military spending is associated with an increase in financial profits more clearly than an increase
in the general rate of profit.
Financial Profit Rates in Relation to Militarization: Bakir and Campbell definitions
Bakir and Campbell (2013) move a step further. Using meticulous calculations, they define
and monitor three types of financial profit rates: Weisskopf, NIPA, and augmented. The
augmented profit rates, which include financial earnings and capital, experienced greater volatility
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than before. The Weisskopf and NIPA rates, on the other hand, are poor proxies for the augmented
rates, especially when there are strong volatile contributions from the omitted financial variables.
Figure 8 presents the three financial profit rates of Bakir and Campbell (B&C) in relation
to the ratio of military expenditure to GDP30. The Weisskopf rate is slightly better at tracking the
augmented financial profit rates whereas the NIPA rate is a much poorer proxy. Similar to
Freeman’s discussion before, these profit rates cannot capture the declining trend when they fail
to properly describe the financial components.
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Notes: For Bakir and Campbell’s NIPA, Weisskopf, and Augmented profit rates, the missing observations after
2011 were obtained by extrapolation.

The three B&C financial profit rate definitions can be modeled in relation to the
militarization indicator 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝 using the following three specifications. All three financial
profit rates are nonlinear in the mean and estimated by the empirical Bayesian method as before.
We form the specifications in an analogous way to the previously described Freeman-type profit
rates, not only for the sake of obtaining comparable results but also because both discuss the
same underlying pattern between financial profits and militarization.
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) = 𝛼* + 𝑓$ (𝑝𝑟_𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑎)

30

(BC.1)

The results do not change when the original data for 1949-2011 is used. The results can be provided on request.
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𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) = 𝛽* + 𝑓$ (𝑝𝑟_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑓)

(BC.2)

𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) = 𝛾* + 𝑓$ (𝑝𝑟_𝑎𝑢𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑)

(BC.3)

The estimation results are presented in Table 9. The augmented profit rate model shows
high nonlinearity, which can be handled by the generalized additive model estimations. This
result is a corollary of the fact that augmented profit rates better characterize the complexity of
financial profits and have much greater volatility, as Bakir and Campbell suggest (p. 299).

Table 9: GAM Estimation Results of Financial Profit Rate Models (BC)
Dependent variable: milex_gdp
BC.1
BC.2
BC.3
***
***
Constant
estimate
6.032
6.032
6.032***
std. err.
0.265
0.293
0.266
s(pr_nipa)
See Figure 9
_
_
s(pr_weisskopf)
_
See Figure 10
_
s(pr_augmented)
_
_
See Figure 11
Approximate significance and basis dimension of smooth terms
s(pr_nipa)
edf
2.828
_
_
p-value
0.00267
_
_
k
9
_
_
s(pr_weisskopf)
edf
_
1.597
_
p-value
_
0.327
_
k
9
_
_
s(pr_augmented)
edf
_
_
4.134
p-value
_
_
0.00922
k
_
_
9
Observations
71
71
71
2
Adjusted R
0.195
0.018
0.188
Deviance
22.70%
4.07%
Explained
23.60%
Log Likelihood
-160.66
-167.111
-161.583
UBRE
159.205
164.827
161.536
Notes: (***) denotes significance at 1%. The values in parentheses are p-values. Edf and k are
effective degrees of freedom and basis functions respectively. UBRE denotes Unbiased Risk
Estimator.

Figures 9-11 present the estimated effects of financial profit rates on the military
expenditure/GDP ratio. The outcomes are parallel to what we found before for the Freeman-type
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profit rates. At the overall level, the three B&C financial profit rates are positively associated
with the military expenditure/GDP ratio. However, one interesting observation follows for the
augmented profit rate models. For very large values of the financial profit rates, the relationship
is reversed. This actually corresponds to higher stages of financialization where an escape
towards unproductive financial capital is accompanying the decline in military expenditure as a
ratio of GDP. Since the NIPA and Weisskopf profit rates are poor proxies as they only partially
represent the financial variables, this reversal does not emerge in the BC.1 and BC.2 models.
Figure 9: GAM Estimations for BC.1 Model

Notes: Left-hand panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right-hand panel shows the diagnostics of the
estimations.
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Figure 10: GAM Estimations for BC.2 Model

Notes: Left-hand panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right-hand panel shows the diagnostics of the
estimations.

Figure 11: GAM Estimations for BC.3 Model

Notes: Left-hand panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right-hand panel shows the diagnostics of the
estimations.

The results of the overall empirical analysis of the financialization-militarization models
explain different pieces of the theory of fictitious capital and their determination with respect to
militarization. The main results can be summarized by several crucial observations. First, the
graphical analyses reveal that both financial and nonfinancial profits generally rose after the
neoliberal transformation. Even when nonfinancial profits declined, financial profits remained
relatively stable and this rise in financial profits went hand in hand with an upsurge in military
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expenditure. Moreover, the degree of financialization, measured by the ratio of financial profits
to nonfinancial profits, also generally increased apart from local deviations. Military expenditure
as a share of GDP, on the other hand, declined slightly. The economic conjuncture, remarkably,
has not been very promising for the capitalist mode of production. As the profit rate calculations
of Freeman (2012) and Bakir and Campbell (2012) show, profits rates tend to decline steadily,
especially after accounting for financial instruments. The decline in the profit rates may have
also led to a decline in all expense items, including military expenditure as a ratio of GDP. This
is reflected by the negative effect of financial profit rates on the military expenditure/GDP ratio.
Whenever financial profits rose during crises, military expenditure as a ratio of GDP contracted
slightly as a compulsory measure. US capitalism may thus have been searching new ways for a
solution to its crisis by occupying through Wall Street, rather than merely invading other
countries with its armed forces.
5. Conclusion
This study aimed to provide the first comprehensive empirical evidence on the nexus of
financialization and militarization. We focused on the U.S. as the key country due to its hegemonic
role in the world economy and politics, analyzing this relationship for 1949-2019 with respect to
the argument of Arrighi (1994) that financialization and militarization are mutually reinforcing
phenomena in the US.
One key contradiction of a capitalist economy is that it must grow continuously. However,
constant growth is restricted by the availability of new markets, new products, and new
technologies. This inevitably leads to a decline in profitability. To prevent profit rates from further
decreasing in the long term, there must be spending in the unproductive sphere of the economy.
The system responded with two counteracting stimuli: the increasing volume of financialization
and the growing role of the financial sector in the economy, and militarization in terms of
consistently excessive military spending. However, we stressed that they may be mutually
interacting rather than independent factors. The absolute dominance of the dollar secured US
global economic hegemony, making the US the center of global financialization. This economic
power allowed it to have an excessive military budget and hundreds of military bases across the
world. This, in turn, maintained the US political power, thereby securing the dollar’s hegemony.
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To investigate this argument empirically, we used various variables based on different
approaches of measuring financialization, namely interest, dividends, and alternative definitions
of financial profits, along with military spending and military spending as a share of GDP.
Employing several parametric and non-parametric methods, we provided suggestive evidence on
the relationship between financialization and militarization in the US.
First, we found significant and complex relationships between different measures of
financialization and militarization. Whereas, overall, increased financialization co-exists with
increased military expenditure, a more careful analysis is required for acceleration. While there
were no causal relationships between military expenditure/GDP and the net interests/GDP or net
dividends/GDP ratios, there was bivariate causality between the ratio of military expenditure to
GDP and the ratio of financial profits to nonfinancial profits. The model estimations suggest a
dialectical relation in which the rise in the degree of financialization is intertwined with a relative
decline of military expenditure as a ratio of GDP.
Second, based on different financialization and financial profit variables, our results
suggest that the definitions of the profit rate and whether they reflect the financial components are
critical. For instance, for very large values of the augmented financial profit rate, there is a negative
relationship with military spending. This corresponds to higher stages of financialization, where
an escape towards the unproductive financial capital goes going hand in hand with a decline in the
military expenditure as a ratio of GDP. However, this effect cannot be captured by Weisskopf or
NIPA definitions. This result also holds true for the Freeman’s corrected profit rates. Here, the link
with militarization is more apparent when financial instruments are included in calculating the
profit rates.
Third, the results complement the findings of Dunne et al. (2013), Ansari (2018), and
Elveren (2019), who found that military spending increased the general rate of profit in the U.S.
for 1949-2010, 1973-2015, and 1951-2016, respectively. The findings in this study show that
military expenditure is positively associated with both the general profit rate and financial profit
rate. As in the case of the profit rates of Freeman, both the general and corrected rates of profits
have a causal effect on military expenditure as a ratio of GDP.
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Finally, our findings suggest that military expenditure is more significantly correlated with
financial profit than the general (i.e., uncorrected) rate of profit as in the case of Freeman’s
corrected profit rate and Bakir and Campbell’s alternative financial profit rate definitions. While
corrected profit rates (i.e., financial profit) have a linear positive impact on military spending, the
uncorrected profit rates show an erratic pattern. This is an important finding, particularly when
considered in relation to the finding that the financial profits/nonfinancial profits ratio is negatively
associated with the military expenditure/GDP ratio, and the causality is bivariate. That is, these
two findings together explain why previous studies reported a less significant effect of military
spending on the rate of (general) profit rate.
We acknowledge that there are several ways to further investigate this important
relationship. For example, using alternative statistical methods and investigating other major
countries in the global financial system would provide further insights.
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Appendix
When the financial profits and military expenditure are expressed in totals, the following
generic model specifications are under consideration:
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) = 𝛼* + 𝑓$ (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥) )

(GM.1)

𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥) = 𝛽* + 𝑓$ (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) )

(GM.2)

The estimation results are presented in Table A.1 and the estimated smooths are shown in
Figures A.1 and A.2.
Table A.1: GAM Estimation Results of Generic Models (GM)
Dependent variable
finprof (GM.1)
milex (GM.2)
***
Constant
126,429.300
273,918.800***
(0.000)
(0.000)
s(milex)
See Figure A.1
s(finprof)
See Figure A.2
Approximate significance and basis dimension of smooth terms
s(milex)
edf
4.32
51

s(finprof)

k
edf

(0.000)
9

6.41
(0.000)
k
9
Observations
71
71
Adjusted R2
0.887
0.923
Deviance Explained
89.4%
93%
Log Likelihood
-874.122
-891.896
UBRE
854.509
874.888
Notes: (***) denotes significance at 1%. The values in parentheses are p-values. edf
and k are effective degrees of freedom and basis functions, respectively. UBRE
denotes Unbiased Risk Estimator.

Figure A.1: GAM Estimations for GM.1 Model

Notes: Left panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right panel shows the diagnostics of the estimations.

Figure A.2: GAM Estimations for GM.2 Model

Notes: Left panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right panel shows the diagnostics of the estimations.
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These generic models have unusually high R-squared measures; yet, they may be
triggered by an underlying factor such as the economic conjuncture measured by the gross
domestic product. As these effects should be controlled in the analysis, we abstain from working
with the totals.
The financialization-militarization model expressed in ratios, rather than the totals, are
studied. When all of the covariates are included in the specification, the model becomes:
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑥_𝑔𝑑𝑝) = 𝛽* + 𝑓$ (𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓) ) + 𝑓& (𝑖𝑛𝑡_𝑔𝑑𝑝) ) + 𝑓+ (𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝) )

(FM)

The estimated results are presented in Table A.2 and Figure A.3. When the results are
compared to the univariate FM.1 and FM.2 models, we observe that the inclusion of the
additional covariates for interests and dividends do not improve the specifications and also does
not alter the overall relation between the ratio of financial to nonfinancial profits and
militarization.

Table A.2: GAM Estimation Results of Financialization-Militarization Models (FM)
Dependent variable: milex_gdp
Constant

FM
6.032***
0.137
See Figure A.3
See Figure A.3
See Figure A.3

estimate
std. err.

s(fin_nonfinprof)
s(int_gdp)
s(divid_gdp)

Approximate significance and basis dimension of smooth terms
s(fin_nonfinprof)
s(int_gdp)
s(divid_gdp)

edf
p-value
k
edf
p-value
k
edf
p-value
k

1.000
0.251
9
3.584
0.000
9
2.120
0.000
9
71
0.786
80.60%
-115.462

Observations
Adjusted R2
Deviance Explained
Log Likelihood
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UBRE
116.573
Notes: (***) denotes significance at 1%. The values in parentheses are pvalues. edf and k are effective degrees of freedom and basis functions
respectively. UBRE denotes Unbiased Risk Estimator.

Figure A.3: GAM Estimation of Financialization-Militarization Models (FM)

Notes: Left panel shows the estimation outcomes. Right panel shows the diagnostics of the estimations.
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